Specification

Preset Certificate Specification Template

[1] The first component in ensuring a properly configured CA is the naming document. Its formal title is the New Issuing Authority Naming Application. This document contains the information necessary to properly configure a CA:

• Name of the organization responsible for the new CA.
• Validity period (or operational period) of the new CA.
• Distinguished Name of the issuing CA.
• Subject Distinguished Name of the new CA.
• Certificate extensions and other certificate content information.

After the Digi-CAST2™ Consultant and the customer have defined the Customer’s CA, the
Digi-CAST2™ Consultant will give you a copy of the completed naming document that has
been signed by both the Digi-CAST2™ Consultant and the Customer. You will use the information in the naming document to create the CA. Detailed information about the naming document is available in Chapter 4, "Key Ceremony Preparation".

Key Ceremony Script

1.Purpose

[1] We have a requirement, that the generation of new RSA keys and creation of new Certification Authorities (CAs) must be witnessed by a third party auditor and appointed witnesses. We must therefore generate fresh keys which have been witnessed in the prescribed manner and use these keys to create new Certification Authorities (CAs).

The keys we generate today will be new keys, having no existing keys residing on the HSM device we are about to use during this ceremony. There are therefore no existing keys residing in the HSM device should this note be relevant to any party participating in this ceremony.

2.Background

We use the nCihper Hardware Security Module devices, model: netHSM 500. These devices are certified to FIPS 140-2 level 2 and 3, and level 3 configuration was chosen for the HSM device we are about to use today during this ceremony.

It is important to note, that the Key Generation and Certificate Signing operations occur entirely within the HSM device which uses a FIPS 140 approved pseudo random-number generator, which is seeded periodically from a random bit-value accumulator fed with an unpredictable input from an electronic noise source.

The prime number generator used in RSA key pair generation is entirely within the HSM and is covered by FIPS 140.

3.Key Generation and Certificate Signing Control Software

Cryptographic Operation Control software: HSM device Support Software and Digi-CA™ PKI [2] System, were both written so that together provide the following capabilities:

1. Instruct an HSM device to "wipe" all keys from its storage.
2. Instruct an HSM device to generate [n] x 4096 bits RSA key pairs.
3. Instruct an HSM device to generate [n] x 2048 bits RSA key pairs.
4. Instruct an HSM device to write those key pairs in an encrypted format to hard disk.
5. Create and split the private key encryption keys into encrypted sets, stored on individual PIN protected smart cards, such that the private keys could be accessed, reconstructed and re-imported to a (new) HSM device only using any 3 of the 5 cards from a defined card sets.
6. Copy the encrypted private key to separate removable media for backup purposes. This process is accomplished using the [Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.0] operating system tools rather than the Cryptographic Operational Control Software.
7. Instruct an HSM device to Load or Import encrypted RSA key pairs from hard disk.
8. Instruct an HSM device to mark all private keys held within itself as non-exportable. This is a default limitation when HSM device is configured to operate in FIPS 140-2 level 3 mode.
9. Combine 3 (of the original 5) smart cards of private key encryption key fragments (components) to produce and encrypt a set of keys on the HSM device.
10. Instruct HSM device to load a private key and sign a new certificate data.

The software and the procedures were tested to ensure, that the keys were valid, and that the import and export procedures were working as required.

The source code was examined to ensure that its operation was correct.

Key Map Template

[1]

Initialization Event

Key Access Component Card Set Configuration

1. [1] An IBM compatible computer (hereafter referred to as "the computer") was set up in a room providing strict personnel access control, security camera monitoring [and electronic isolation from any computer networks].

2. The computer has a hard disk which has been pre-prepared with a fresh installation of a [Red Hat Enterprise Linux, version 5.0] operating system, the requisite HSM driver, nToken authentication PCI device, HSM device Support Software and the
Digi-CA™ PKI System, both acting as the Cryptographic Operation Control Software. The software was tested for correct operation prior to the Key Ceremony by using an HSM reserved for backup purposes.

3. The Key Access Component Cards are going to be distributed to appointed Key Access Component Holders during a later event of this ceremony. It is however important to note, that Key Access Component Holders are the only holders possessing PIN codes necessary to access the data stored on these smart cards. Before this step can be completed, each appointed Key Access Component Holder must now write down their new PIN code on a dedicated PIN paper sheet and put the PIN paper sheet with the written PIN code into an envelope, indicating their full personal name. Each envelope is to be placed on the Inventory Table and remain not sealed for the duration of the entire Key Ceremony. All attending Witnesses must ensure, that Key Access Component Holders are inserting their PIN Code paper sheets into correct envelopes, that indicate their full personal name.
Key Ceremony Administrator should now place a sufficient number of empty Key Access Component Cards on top of the envelopes containing PIN Code paper sheets. It is important to note, that the video camera should constantly record all activities related to access to the Key Access Component Cards and envelopes containing PIN Code paper sheets.

The Key Ceremony Administrator is now going to note the new Name for the newly configured Key Access Component Card Set, the Serial Number of each Key Access Component Card, that is about to be used and the details of each Key Access Component Holder (below) in this script. All attending Key Ceremony Witnesses must ensure, that the date entered into the script, the full personal name of each Key Access Component Holder and the Serial Number of the Key Access Component Card they are about to use is correct. They also must place their signature where indicated (below) in this section of the script.

Date: …………………………………………

Key Access Component Card Set
Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Key Access Component Holder #1
Full Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Card Serial Number: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Key Access Component Holder #2
Full Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Card Serial Number: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Key Access Component Holder #3
Full Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Card Serial Number: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Key Access Component Holder #4
Full Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Card Serial Number: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Key Access Component Holder #5
Full Name: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Card Serial Number: ……………………………………………………………………………………………

Witnessing Attendees’ Signatures

• 4. [1] The first HSM device (designated #1) was removed from production and connected to the computer prior to this ceremony and the event was monitored and supervised by an appointed company’s Head of Security.

The Cryptographic Operation Control Software is now about to be used to cause the numbered (in section 3 above) operations to occur in the following sequence: 5.

During this phase of the Key Generation Ceremony, a new Key Access Component Card Set is created and bound to our HSM device security infrastructure. The card set configuration we choose is as follows:

a. Total number of smart cards in a card set: 5

b. Minimum number of smart cards required to access the private key: 3

c. Minimum number of smart cards required to recreate any lost smart card: 3

d. Minimum number of smart cards required to recover lost PIN codes: 3

e. Minimum number of smart cards required to recover a private key: 3



During this step, one of the HSM Security Administrators present at the ceremony will be requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator to insert his Administrator’s Smart Card into the smart card reader interface of the HSM device in order to authorize the creation of a new Key Access Component Card Set. This is required by the HSM device, which operates in FIPS 140-2 level 3 modes.

Further during step, each appointed (in previous step) Key Access Component Holder will be requested to actively participate in the ceremony. The Key Generation Ceremony Administrator will require each Key Access Component Holder to separately follow the steps below:

a. Access their PIN envelope, that were previously placed on the Inventory Table

b. Re-read and memorize their PIN codes, that were previously written on their PIN Code paper sheet

c. Confirm to memorize their PIN code

d. Place their PIN Code paper sheet back into their envelope and place the envelope not sealed back on the Inventory Table

e. Take their smart card from the Inventory Table and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, walk towards the HSM device

f. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, insert their smart card into the smart card reader interface of the HSM device and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, enter and confirm their memorized PIN Code.

g. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, remove the smart card from the HSM smart card reader interface and place their smart card back on the Inventory Table on top of their PIN envelope.
The above sequence of steps will be repeated for each appointed new Key Access Component Holder.
All attending Witnesses must ensure, that each Key Access Component Holder accesses only their own Key Access Component Card and PIN envelope. They must also ensure, that all PIN Code paper sheets remain in envelopes, which are not sealed, and that relevant Key Access Component Cards reside on the top of each envelope on the Inventory Table at the end of this step.




• 5. The previous step left the HSM device #1 configured for use with our newly configured Key Access Component Card Set, commonly referred to as Operator Card Set.

The new card set will be subsequently used during this ceremony to encrypt and protect access to relevant private keys we are about to generate. The encryption key elements [components] are now stored on each PIN protected Key Access Component Card, which will be required to access newly generated and access protected private keys at any time.



• 6. The Key Access Component Card Set Configuration is now declared complete.

Controls

[1] During the Key Access Component Card Set Configuration, at least two people from the Key Ceremony Attendees list of personnel were present at all times. No other personnel were permitted access to the room. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software required a PIN code to be entered before the software could communicate with any smart card (holding encryption key component [Key Access Component Card]) used during the Key Access Component Card Set configuration.

5.Generation Event

• 5.1 Key Generation Ceremony
1. An IBM compatible computer (hereafter referred to as "the computer") was set up in a room providing strict personnel access control, security camera monitoring [and electronic isolation from any computer networks].

2. The computer has a hard disk which has been pre-prepared with a fresh installation of a [Red Hat Enterprise Linux, version 5.0] operating system, the requisite HSM driver, nToken authentication PCI device, HSM device Support Software and the Digi-CA™ PKI [2] System, both acting as the Cryptographic Operation Control Software. The software was tested for correct operation prior to the Key Generation Ceremony by using an HSM reserved for backup purposes.

3. The first HSM device (designated #1) was removed from production and connected to the computer prior to this ceremony and the event was monitored and supervised by an appointed company’s Head of Security. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software is now about to be used to cause the numbered (in section 3 above) operations to occur in the following sequence:

9, 2, 4, 3, 4, 6, 6, 6.

During this step, the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator will capture and store any relevant informational output produced on the computer screen by the Cryptographic Operation Control Software in the Key Map Document.

Also during this step, the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator will require any 3 (three) Key Access Component Holders from the previously created Key Access Component Card Set, to separately follow the steps below:

a. Access their PIN envelope, that were previously placed on the Inventory Table

b. Re-read and memorize their PIN codes, that were previously written on their PIN Code paper sheet

c. Confirm to memorize their PIN code

d. Place their PIN Code paper sheet back into their envelope and place the envelope not sealed back on the Inventory Table

e. Take their smart card from the Inventory Table and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, walk towards the HSM device

f. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, insert their smart card into the smart card reader interface of the HSM device and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, enter their memorized PIN Code.

g. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, remove the smart card from the HSM smart card reader interface and place their smart card back on the Inventory Table on top of their PIN envelope.
The above sequence of steps will be repeated for the number of Key Access Component Holders that are selected by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator.
All attending Witnesses must ensure, that each Key Access Component Holder accesses only their own Key Access Component Card and PIN envelope. They must also ensure, that all PIN Code paper sheets remain in envelopes, which are not sealed, and that relevant Key Access Component Cards reside on the top of each envelope on the Inventory Table at the end of this step.

Controls & Generation Events

Key Generation Ceremony

• 4. [1] The previous step left the HSM device #1 configured for use with our newly generated keys.
The encrypted private keys are now stored securely within an encrypted key repository on the hard disk within the computer, as well as on the removable media. Only the HSM device holding decryption keys for the particular key repository is able to decrypt the repository data. Further decryption process is also required to bring keys to an online state. The latter applies to particular keys, that we protected with additional encryption key during the key generation phase.

The encryption key elements [components] are stored on several PIN protected smart cards, herein referred to as "Key Access Component Cards", which are required to access these keys at any time. The smart cards are currently visible on the Inventory Table and during the later phase of this ceremony will be distributed to the Key Access Component Holders, who are the only holders possessing PIN codes necessary to access the data stored on these smart cards.

We note, that there is no need to delete our encrypted keys from the hard disk within the computer as these keys are strongly encrypted by the HSM device and additional encryption key, that was divided into key elements (components) within a key set. If the key repository data was stolen, it would be useless without the HSM decryption key and additional encryption key elements (components) distributed to Key Access Component Holders inside the PIN protected Key Access Component Cards. The encrypted keys stored within the repository are in offline state and the computer with the hard drive storing the encrypted repository data will be kept safe in an isolated room with strict personnel and network access controls in place as well as video camera monitoring maintained 24 hours per day throughout the year.




• 5. We will now generate checksum bytes, that will uniquely identify the encrypted private key data stored both on the hard disk and on the backup media disks.
For this purpose, we will use an Operating System tool [sha1sum]. The Key Ceremony Administrator will now sequentially, using the Key Map Document, read the file names and file system paths for each generated private key, generate the checksum bytes calculated on private keys stored inside the repository as well as on the backup media and note the checksum byte strings (below) in this script.

All witnesses attending this part of the ceremony must ensure, that the date entered into this script is correct and the checksum values presented on the computer screen upon sequential execution of the checksum calculation commands, that are performed on private key data stored inside the repository as well as on the backup media, and the values written below by the Key Ceremony Administrator, exactly match. They also must place their signatures where indicated (below) in this section of the script.

Date: …………………………………………

Key 1
Common Name: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Checksum: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Key 2
Common Name: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Checksum: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…

Key N
Common Name: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Checksum: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Witnessing Attendees’ Signatures:

Generation Events

Key Generation Ceremony

• 6. [1] The removable media disks holding backup copies of our keys will now be separated placed into sealed envelopes and sent to be held at separate bank deposit facilities immediately after this ceremony.
We note, that each media disk was removed from this computer sequentially for storage purposes in each of the indicated storage facilities.




• 7. The Key Generation Ceremony is now declared complete.

Controls

During the Key Generation Ceremony, at least two people from the Key Ceremony Attendees list of personnel were present at all times. No other personnel were permitted access to the room. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software required a PIN code to be entered before the software could communicate with any smart card (holding encryption key component [Key Access Component Card]) used during the Key Generation Ceremony.

6. Signing Event

• 6.1 Root CA Signing
1. An IBM compatible computer (hereafter referred to as "the computer") was set up in a room providing strict personnel access control, security camera monitoring [and electronic isolation from any computer networks].


2. The computer has a hard disk which has been pre-prepared with a fresh installation of a [Red Hat Enterprise Linux, version 5.0] operating system, the requisite HSM driver, nToken authentication PCI device, HSM device Support Software and the
Digi-CA™ PKI [2] System, both acting as the Cryptographic Operation Control Software. The software was tested for correct operation prior to the Key Ceremony by using an HSM reserved for backup purposes.


3. The hard disk installed in the computer contains an encrypted key repository, from which we will load necessary private keys into a securely protected operational memory of our HSM device.


4. The first HSM device (designated #1) was removed from production and connected to the computer prior to this ceremony and the event was monitored and supervised by an appointed company’s Head of Security. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software is now about to be used to cause the numbered (in section 3 above) operations to occur in the following sequence: 10.

During this step, the Key Ceremony Administrator, using the Cryptographic Operation Control Software, will create new self-signed Root CA Certificate and assign it to a dedicated private key that was previously generated during this ceremony.

To complete this process, the Key Ceremony Administrator will use a Naming Document, that contains the details of the new Root CA Certificate we are about to sign, to create a certificate profile configuration file, containing various certificate related information such as: Subject Distinguished Name, Validity Period, Signature Algorithm, Certificate Serial Number and Certificate extensions. The certificate profile configuration file will be used by the Cryptographic Operation Control Software to create the new Root CA certificate.

All attending Witnesses must ensure, that the certificate details entered into the certificate profile configuration file by the Key Ceremony Administrator, match the details contained in the Naming Document used during this ceremony. The new Root CA Certificate details must be taken from the section of the Naming Document specifically dedicated for the correct Root CA, for which the Root CA Certificate is created.

Key Ceremony Administrator will capture and store during this step any relevant informational output produced on the computer screen by the Cryptographic Operation Control Software in the Key Map Document.
Upon directing the Cryptographic Operation Control Software to sign the new Root CA Certificate, the dedicated private key will need to be loaded to the HSM securely protected operational memory.

Component Holders

Root CA Signing

[1] 4. Since the private key we are about to use is encrypted and access protected, the Key Ceremony Administrator will require any 3 (three) Key Access Component Holders from the previously created Key Access Component Card Set, to separately follow the steps below:

a. Access their PIN envelope, that were previously placed on the Inventory Table

b. Re-read and memorize their PIN codes, that were previously written on their PIN Code paper sheet

c. Confirm to memorize their PIN code

d. Place their PIN Code paper sheet back into their envelope and place the envelope not sealed back on the Inventory Table

e. Take their smart card from the Inventory Table and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, walk towards the HSM device

f. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, insert their smart card into the smart card reader interface of the HSM device and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, enter their memorized PIN Code.

g. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, remove the smart card from the HSM smart card reader interface and place their smart card back on the Inventory Table on top of their PIN envelope.

The above sequence of steps will be repeated for the number of Key Access Component Holders, that are selected by the Key Ceremony Administrator.

All attending Witnesses must ensure, that each Key Access Component Holder accesses only their own Key Access Component Card and PIN envelope. They must also ensure, that all PIN Code paper sheets remain in envelopes, which are not sealed, and that relevant Key Access Component Cards reside on the top of each envelope on the Inventory Table at the end of this step.

Furthermore, all Witnesses must ensure, that the correct private key is used during this step. This can be achieved by cross-checking whether the private key identifier file name along with the file system path, are both entered correctly by the Key Ceremony Administrator in the command prompt. These must match the private key details stored in the Key Map Document. The private key should be dedicated for use only with the new Root CA we created today hence the cross-check.


5. The previous step left the private key used to sign the newly created Root CA Certificate offline. It also permanently associated that private key with the new Root CA we created.


6. The Root CA Signing is now declared complete.

Subordinate CA Signing

1. [1] An IBM compatible computer (hereafter referred to as "the computer") was set up in a room providing strict personnel access control, security camera monitoring [and electronic isolation from any computer networks].


2. The computer has a hard disk which has been pre-prepared with a fresh installation of a [Red Hat Enterprise Linux, version 5.0] operating system, the requisite HSM driver, nToken authentication PCI device, HSM device Support Software and the Digi-CA™ PKI [2] System, both acting as the Cryptographic Operation Control Software. The software was tested for correct operation prior to the Key Ceremony by using an HSM reserved for backup purposes.


3. The hard disk installed in the computer contains an encrypted key repository, from which we will load necessary private keys into a securely protected operational memory of our HSM device.


4. The first HSM device (designated #1) was removed from production and connected to the computer prior to this ceremony and the event was monitored and supervised by an appointed company’s Head of Security. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software is now about to be used to cause the numbered (in section 3 above) operations to occur in the following sequence: 10.

During this step, the Key Ceremony Administrator, using the Cryptographic Operation Control Software, will create new Subordinate CA and assign it to a dedicated private key that was previously generated during this ceremony. The newly created Subordinate CA will be signed by the Root CA that was created earlier during this ceremony.

To complete this process, the Key Ceremony Administrator will use a Naming Document, that contains the details of the new Subordinate CA we are about to sign, to create a certificate profile configuration file, containing various certificate related information such as: Subject Distinguished Name, Validity Period, Signature Algorithm, Certificate Serial Number and Certificate extensions. The certificate profile configuration file will be used by the Cryptographic Operation Control Software to create the new Subordinate CA certificate.

All attending Witnesses must ensure, that the certificate details entered into the certificate profile configuration file by the Key Ceremony Administrator, match the details contained in the Naming Document used during this ceremony. The new Subordinate CA Certificate details must be taken from the section of the Naming Document specifically dedicated for the correct Subordinate CA, for which the Subordinate CA Certificate is created.
Key Ceremony Administrator will capture and store during this step any relevant informational output produced on the computer screen by the Cryptographic Operation Control Software in the Key Map Document.

Key Access Component Holders

• [1] Upon directing the Cryptographic Operation Control Software to sign the new Subordinate CA Certificate, the private key of the Root CA will need to be loaded to the HSM securely protected operational memory.
Since the private key of the Root CA we are about to use is encrypted and access protected, the Key Ceremony Administrator will require any 3 (three) Key Access Component Holders from the previously created Key Access Component Card Set, to separately follow the steps below:


a. Access their PIN envelope, that were previously placed on the Inventory Table

b. Re-read and memorize their PIN codes, that were previously written on their PIN Code paper sheet

c. Confirm to memorize their PIN code

d. Place their PIN Code paper sheet back into their envelope and place the envelope not sealed back on the Inventory Table

e. Take their smart card from the Inventory Table and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, walk towards the HSM device

f. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, insert their smart card into the smart card reader interface of the HSM device and when requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, enter their memorized PIN Code.

g. When requested by the Key Generation Ceremony Administrator, remove the smart card from the HSM smart card reader interface and place their smart card back on the Inventory Table on top of their PIN envelope.



The above sequence of steps will be repeated for the number of Key Access Component Holders, that are selected by the Key Ceremony Administrator.

All attending Witnesses must ensure, that each Key Access Component Holder accesses only their own Key Access Component Card and PIN envelope. They must also ensure, that all PIN Code paper sheets remain in envelopes, which are not sealed, and that relevant Key Access Component Cards reside on the top of each envelope on the Inventory Table at the end of this step. Furthermore, all Witnesses must ensure, that the correct Root CA private key is used during this step. This can be achieved by crosschecking whether the private key identifier file name along with the file system path, are both entered correctly by the Key Ceremony Administrator in the command prompt. These must match the Root CA private key details stored in the Key Map Document. The correct Root CA private key should be used hence the crosscheck.




• 5. The previous step left the Root CA private key used to sign the newly created Subordinate CA Certificate offline.

It also permanently associated an existing private key, that was generated earlier during this ceremony with the new Subordinate CA we created.



• 6. The Subordinate CA Signing is now declared complete.




Controls

During the Signing Event, at least two people from the Key Ceremony Attendees list of personnel were present at all times. No other personnel were permitted access to the room. The Cryptographic Operation Control Software required a PIN code to be entered before the software could communicate with any smart card (holding encryption key component [Key Access Component Card]) used during the Signing Event.

Distribution Event

• Key Access Component Card Distribution
[1] During this phase of the ceremony, the Key Ceremony Administrator will request each Key Access Component Card Holder to place their Key Access Component Cards in their PIN envelopes place the envelopes sealed on the Inventory Table.




• Key Access Component Holder Document Signing
During this phase of the ceremony, the Key Ceremony Administrator will request each Key Access Component Holder to sign the Key Access Component Holder Document indicating, that they have read, understand and agree to follow the duties and responsibilities of a Key Access Component Holder and that they have witnessed the signature of all the other Key Access Component Holders.




• Key Map Document Signing
During this phase of the ceremony, all attending Witnesses will sign the Key Map Document indicating, that this was the actual document used during the ceremony and it was completed with accordance to the script.




• Naming Document Signing
During this phase of the ceremony, all attending Witnesses will sign the Naming Document indicating, that this was the actual document used during the ceremony with accordance to the script to create our new CA hierarchy.




• Attestation Letter Signing
During this phase of the ceremony, all attending Witnesses will sign Attestation Letters indicating, that they read the script, observed the ceremony and attest, that the ceremony was performed as described in the script.




• Key Ceremony Script Signing
During this phase of the ceremony, all attending Witnesses will sign the Key Ceremony Script document indicating, that this was the actual document used during the ceremony w to create our new CA hierarchy.




• Signature Certification
During this phase of the ceremony, the Key Ceremony Administrator will direct the official representative of the Government, to notarize (certify signatures on) the witnesses’ Attestation Letters.

Conclusion

8. Key Ceremony Conclusion

• [1] All copies of the signed Key Ceremony Script are now going to be placed in the Archive Folder.
• All copies of Attestation Letters are now going to be placed in the Archive Folder.
• All copies of Key Access Component Holder Documents are now going to be placed in the Archive Folder.
• The Key Map Document is now going to place in the Archive Folder.
• The Naming Document is now going to place in the Archive Folder.
• The camera operator will now stop the recording and all Video Recordings are now going to be placed in the Archive Folder.
• The Archive Folder is now going to be sealed.
• The Head of Security will now take the sealed Archive Folder and place it in a safe in a dedicated access protected cabinet.
• The Head of Company’s Security will now direct all Key Access Component Holders to take their envelopes containing PIN Code paper sheets and Key Access Component Cards and place these securely in a safe in separate access protected cabinets.
• All hardware equipment, including the HSM device and the computer will be taken from this room after this ceremony and installed back in the production environment in a dedicated access protected and video camera monitored room.
• After the ceremony is complete, the Digi-Sign Digi-CAST2™ installation team will proceed to the CA Activation event, which will be monitored and supervised by the Head of Company’s Security. The CA Activation Event is not a part of this ceremony and may be performed at a different date.
• The Key Ceremony is now declared complete.

9. Key Ceremony Attendees Present

Name Title Company Signature

[This page printed blank to allow notes to be made]

Component Holder Document

Appendix V – Key Access Component Holder Document

[1] I am:

CA Organization Shareholder’s Name:

_______________________________________________________________________
CA Owner Organization Name:

___________________________________________________________
CA Owner Organization’s Address:

___________________________________________________________
CA Owner Organization’s Telephone Number:

___________________________________________________________

Passport:
ID Card:
Other (specify___________)
No:____________________

I confirm that I am in receipt of the following Component(s):

Description Details:

_________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________


I confirm that:

I have understand that I am an official Component Receipt Shareholder.

I must keep my Component information secret.

I will only reveal my Component information at scheduled Key Ceremony events.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the information I have provided is true, correct, and complete.

Signature: ___________________________________ Date: ____________________


I attest that:

I have validated the identity of this Key Access Component Holder

Under penalties of perjury, I declare to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the information I have provided is true, correct, and complete.

Notary Signature: _____________________________ Date:____________________

Attestation Letter

Appendix VI – Attestation Letter

[1] I am:

A Certified Public Notary
An Attorney
An Official Public witness

Name:

_______________________________________________________________________

Organization Name:

___________________________________________________________

Organization Address:

___________________________________________________________

Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________________


Professional License and/or Association Number(s):_________________________

This letter of attestation is being provided on behalf of the following entity:

CA Owner Organization’s Name:

________________________________________________________________

CA Owner Organization’s Address:

________________________________________________________________

CA Owner Organization’s Telephone Number:

________________________________________________________________

I attest that:

I have read the attached Key Ceremony Script
I have verified the identity of the Digi-CAST2™ Key Ceremony Administrator
I have validated the identity of each witness attendee
I have validated the identity of each shareholder attendee
I have validated the identity of each observer attendee
I have observed the Key Ceremony
I have observed all the attendees of the Key Ceremony
The Key Ceremony was performed as described in the attached Script
I have certified the signed Component Receipt Documents
I have certified the sealed Archive Folder

Under penalties of perjury, I declare to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the information I have provided is true, correct, and complete.

Signature: ___________________________________ Date: ____________________

Notary Signature: _____________________________ Date: ____________________

Appendix III – Entry/Exit Log

CA Owner Organization’s Name:

________________________________________________________________

CA Owner Organization’s Address:

________________________________________________________________

CA Owner Organization’s Telephone Number:

________________________________________________________________